Ex-Armyman Naresh randomly kills 6 innocent Indians in 1 hour

Mar 3: Just hours after the ending of a week-long “reduction” in violence that was crucial for Donald Trump’s peace deal in Afghanistan, the Taliban struck again: On Monday, they killed three people and injured about a dozen at a football match in Khost province. This resumption of violence will not surprise anyone actually invested in peace for that troubled country. The point of the U.S.-Taliban deal was never peace. It was to try and cover up an ignominious exit for the U.S., driven by an election-bound president who feels no responsibility toward that country or to the broader region.

Seen from South Asia, every point we know about in the agreement is a concession by Trump to the Taliban. Most importantly, it completes a long-term effort by the U.S. to delegitimize the elected government in Kabul — and, by extension, Afghanistan’s constitution. Afghanistan’s president is already balking at releasing 5,000 Taliban prisoners before intra-Afghan talks can begin — a provision that his government did not approve.

One particularly cringe-worthy aspect: The agreement refers to the Taliban throughout  as “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan that is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban.” This unwieldy nomenclature validates the Taliban’s claim to be a government equivalent to the one in Kabul, just not the one recognised at the moment by the U.S. When read together with the second part of the agreement, which binds the U.S. to not “intervene in [Afghanistan’s] domestic affairs,” the point is obvious: The Taliban is not interested in peace, but in ensuring that support for its rivals is forbidden, and its path to Kabul is cleared.

All that the U.S. has effectively gotten in return is the Taliban’s assurance that it will not allow the soil of Afghanistan to be used against the “U.S. and its allies.” True, the U.S. under Trump has shown a disturbing willingness to trust solemn assurances from autocrats; but its apparent belief in promises made by a murderous theocratic movement is even more ridiculous. Especially as the Taliban made much the same promise to an Assistant Secretary of State about Osama bin Laden while he was in the country plotting 9/11.

Nobody in the region is pleased with this agreement except for the Taliban and their backers in the Pakistani military. India has consistently held that the legitimate government in Kabul must be the basic anchor of any peace plan. Ordinary Afghans, unsurprisingly, long for peace — but they are, by all accounts, deeply skeptical about how this deal will get them there. The brave activists of the Afghan Women’s Network are worried that intra-Afghan talks will take place without adequate representation of the country’s women — who have, after all, the most to lose from a return to Taliban rule.

But the Pakistani military establishment is not hiding its glee. One retired general tweeted: “Big victory for Afghan Taliban as historic accord signed… Forced Americans to negotiate an accord from the position of parity. Setback for India.” Pakistan’s army, the Taliban’s biggest backer, longs to re-install a friendly Islamist regime in Kabul — and it has correctly estimated that, after being abandoned by Trump, the Afghan government will have sharply reduced bargaining power in any intra-Afghan peace talks. A deal with the Taliban that fails also to include its backers in the Pakistani military is meaningless.

India, meanwhile, will not see this deal as a positive for regional peace or its relationship with the U.S. It comes barely a week after Trump’s India visit, which made it painfully clear that shared strategic concerns are the only thing keeping the countries together. New Delhi remembers that India is not, on paper, a U.S. “ally.” In that respect, an intensification of terrorism targeting India, as happened the last time the U.S. withdrew from the region, would not even be a violation of Trump’s agreement. One possible outcome: Over time the government in New Delhi, which has resolutely sought to keep its ties with Kabul primarily political, may have to step up security cooperation. Nobody knows where that would lead.

The irresponsible concessions made by the U.S. in this agreement will likely disrupt South Asia for years to come, and endanger its own relationship with India going forward. But worst of all, this deal abandons those in Afghanistan who, under the shadow of war, tried to develop, for the first time, institutions that work for all Afghans. No amount of sanctimony about “ending America’s longest war” should obscure the danger and immorality of this sort of exit.

New Delhi, Jan 17: Deputy Chief Minister Manish Sisodia does not have any car on his name, according to information shared in the poll affidavit filed by him for Delhi elections.

In the affidavit, it is also shown that while his self-acquired immovable property remained roughly the same as in 2015. His wife's self-acquired immovable property is worth roughly about Rs 65 lakh, as per his latest affidavit.

In the papers submitted during the nomination for 2015 Delhi polls, the senior AAP leader had declared that he owned a Maruti Swift car of make 2013.

However, in his 2020 affidavit, he has mentioned "nil" in the column for motor vehicles and other means of transport.

In the affidavit submitted on Thursday, his moveable assets were declared worth Rs 4,74,888 for 2018-19, as against Rs 4,92,624 for 2013-14.

In 2015, Sisodia had informed in his affidavit that he had bought a property in Vasundhara, Ghaziabad, worth Rs 5.07 lakh in April 2001. The approximate current market value of self-acquired property in 2015 was Rs 12 lakh.

In his current affidavit, the AAP leader has mentioned the same property. However, the approximate current market value of self-acquired property in 2020 has increased to Rs 21 lakh.

In his affidavit for the 2015 polls, Sisodia had also said that his wife had purchased a property in March 2008 costing Rs 8.70 lakh. At that time, the approximate value of her self-acquired property was Rs 20 lakh.

New Delhi, May 27: India’s fourth recession since Independence, first since liberalisation, and perhaps the worst to date is here, according to rating agency, Crisil.

CRISIL sees the Indian economy shrinking 5 per cent in fiscal 2021 (on-year), because of the Covid-19 pandemic. The first quarter will suffer a staggering 25 per cent contraction.

About 10 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in real terms could be permanently lost. "So going back to the growth rates seen before the pandemic is unlikely in the next three fiscals", Crisil said.

Crisil has revised its earlier forecast downwards. "Earlier, on April 28, we had slashed our prediction to 1.8 per cent growth from 3.5 per cent growth. Things have only gone downhill since", it said.

While we expect non-agricultural GDP to contract 6 per cent, agriculture could cushion the blow by growing at 2.5 per cent.

In the past 69 years, India has seen a recession only thrice as per available data in fiscals 1958, 1966 and 1980. The reason was the same each time a monsoon shock that hit agriculture, then a sizeable part of the economy.

"The recession staring at us today is different," it added. For one, agriculture could soften the blow this time by growing near its trend rate, assuming a normal monsoon. Two, the pandemic-induced lockdowns have affected most non-agriculture sectors. And three, the global disruption has upended whatever opportunities India had on the exports front.

Economic conditions have slid precipitously since the April-end forecast of 1.8 per cent GDP growth for fiscal 2021 (baseline), Crisil said.

On the lockdown extension, it said that the government has extended the lockdown four times to deal with the rising number of cases, curtailing economic activity severely (lockdown 4.0 is ending on May 31).

The first quarter of this fiscal will be the worst affected. June is unlikely to see major relaxations as the Covid-19 affliction curve is yet to flatten in India.

"Not only will the first quarter be a washout for the non-agricultural economy, services such as education, and travel and tourism among others, could continue to see a big hit in the quarters to come. Jobs and incomes will see extended losses as these sectors are large employers," Crisil said.

CRISIL also foresees economic activity in states with high Covid-19 cases to suffer prolonged disruption as restrictions could continue longer.

A rough estimate based on a sample of eight states, which contribute over half of India's GDP, shows that their 'red zones' (as per lockdown 3.0) contributed 42 per cent to the state GDP on average regardless of the share of such red zones.

On average, the orange zones contribute 46 per cent, while the green zones where activity is allowed to be close to normal contribute only 12 per cent to state GDP.

The economic costs are higher than earlier expectations, according to Crisil. The economic costs now beginning to show up in the hard numbers are far worse than initial expectations.

Industrial production for March fell by over 16%. The purchasing managers indices for the manufacturing and services sectors were at 27.4 and 5.4, respectively, in April, implying extraordinary contraction. That compares with 51.8 and 49.3, respectively, in March.

Exports contracted 60.3 per cent in April, and new telecom subscribers declined 35 per cent, while railway freight movement plunged 35 per cent on-year.

"Indeed, given one of the most stringent lockdowns in the world, April could well be the worst performing month for India this fiscal," it said.

Added to that is the economic package without enough muscle. The government recently announced a Rs 20.9 lakh crore economic relief package to support the economy. The package has some short-term measures to cushion the economy, but sets its sights majorly on reforms, most of which will have payoffs only over the medium term.

"We estimate the fiscal cost of this package at 1.2 per cent of GDP, which is lower than what we had assumed in our earlier estimate (when we foresaw a growth in GDP)," it said.

"We believe a catch-up to the pre-crisis trend level of GDP growth will not be possible in the next three fiscals despite policy support. Under the base case, we estimate a 10 per cent permanent loss to real GDP (from the decadal-trend level), assuming average growth of about 7 per cent between fiscals 2022 and 2024," Crisil said.

Interestingly, after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a sharp growth spurt helped catch up with the trend within two years. GDP grew 8.2 per cent on average in the two fiscals following the GFC. Massive fiscal spending, monetary easing and swift global recovery played a role in a V-shaped recovery.

To catch-up would require average GDP growth to surge to 11 per cent over the next three fiscals, something that has never happened before.

The research said that successive lockdowns have a non-linear and multiplicative effect on the economy a two-month lockdown will be more than twice as debilitating as a one-month imposition, as buffers keep eroding.

Partial relaxations continue to be a hindrance to supply chains, transportation and logistics. Hence, unless the entire supply chain is unlocked, the impact of improved economic activity will be subdued.

Therefore, despite the stringency of lockdown easing a tad in the third and the fourth phases, their negative impact on GDP is expected to massively outweigh the benefits from mild fiscal support and low crude oil prices, especially in the April-June quarter. "Consequently, we expect the current quarter's GDP to shrink 25 per cent on-year," it said.

Counting lockdown 4.0, Indians have had 68 days of confinement. S&P Global estimates that one month of lockdown shaves 3 per cent off annual GDP on average across Asia-Pacific.

Since India's lockdown has been the most stringent in Asia, the impact on economic growth will be correspondingly larger.

Google's Community Mobility Reports show a sharp fall in movement of people to places of recreation, retail shops, public transport and workplace travel. While data for May shows some improvement in India, mobility trends are much below the average or baseline, and lower compared with countries such as the US, South Korea, Brazil and Indonesia.