Israel a 'cancerous tumour' established by west, says Iran's Rouhani

New Delhi, Jun 16: Despite Prime Minister Narendra Modi led government’s attempt to downplay the border dispute with China, matters have heated up unprecedentedly along the Line of Actual Control (LAC)- the effective Sino-India border in Eastern Ladakh. 

The country has lost three precious lives – an army officer and two soldiers. The last time blood was spilled on the LAC, before the latest episode, was 45 years ago when the Chinese ambushed an Assam Rifles patrol in Tulung La.

India had lost four soldiers on October 20, 1975 in Tulung La, the last time bullets were fired on the India-China border though both the countries witnessed bitter stand-offs later at Sumdorong Chu valley in 1987, Depsang in 2013, Chumar in 2014 and Doklam in 2017.

Between 1962 and 1975, the biggest clash between India and China took place in Nathu La pass in 1967 when reports suggest that around 80 Indian soldiers were killed and many more Chinese personnel.

While three soldiers, including a Commanding Officer, were killed in the latest episode in Galwan Valley, the government describes it as a "violent clash" and does not mention opening fire.

New Delhi described the locality where the 1975 incident took place as "well within" its territory only to be rebuffed by Beijing as "sheer reversal of black and white and confusion of right and wrong".

The Ministry of External Affairs had then said that the Chinese had crossed the LAC and ambushed the soldiers while Beijing claimed the Indians entered their territory and did not return despite warnings.

The Indian government maintained that the ambush on the Assam Rifles' patrol in 1975 took place "500 metres south of Tulung" on the border between India and Tibet and "therefore in Indian territory". It said Chinese soldiers "penetrating" Indian territory implied a "change in China's position" on the border question but the Chinese denied this and blamed India for the incident.

The US diplomatic cables quoted an Indian military intelligence officer saying that the Chinese had erected stone walls on the Indian side of Tulung La and from these positions fired several hundred rounds at the Indian patrol.

"Four of the Indians had gone into a leading position while two (the ones who escaped) remained behind. The senior military intelligence officer emphasised that the soldiers on the Indian patrol were from the area and had patrolled that same region many times before," the cable said.

One of the US cables showed that former US Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger sought details of the October 1975 clash "without approaching the host governments on actual location of October 20 incident". He also wanted to know what ground rules were followed regarding the proximity of LAC by border patrols.

A cable sent from the US mission in India on November 4, 1975 appeared to have doubts about the Chinese account saying it was "highly defensive".

"Given the unsettled situation on the sub-continent, particularly in Bangladesh, both Chinese and Indian authorities have authorised stepped up patrols along the disputed border. The clash may well have ensued when two such patrols unexpectedly encountered each other," it said.

Another cable from China on the same day quoted another October 1974 cable, which spoke about Chinese officials being concerned for long that "some hotheaded person on the PRC (People's Republic of China) might provoke an incident that could lead to renewed Sino-Indian hostilities. It went on to say that this clash suggested that "such concerns and apprehensions are not unwarranted".

According to the United States diplomatic cables, Chinese Foreign Ministry on November 3, 1975 disputed the statement of the MEA spokesperson, who said the incident took place inside Indian territory.

The Chinese had said "sheer reversal of black and white and confusion of right and wrong". In its version of the 1975 incident, they said Indian troops crossed the LAC at 1:30 PM at Tulung Pass on the Eastern Sector and "intruded" into their territory when personnel at the Civilian Checkpost at Chuna in Tibet warned them to withdraw.

Ignoring this, they claimed, Indian soldiers made "continual provocation and even opened fire at the Chinese civilian checkpost personnel, posing a grave threat to the life of the latter. The Chinese civilian checkpost personnel were obliged to fire back in self defence."

The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson had also said they told the Indian side that they could collect the bodies "anytime" and on October 28, collected the bodies, weapons and ammunition and "signed a receipt".

The US cables from the then USSR suggested that the official media carried reports from Delhi on the October 1975 incident and they cited only Indian accounts of the incident "ridiculing alleged Chinese claims that the Indians crossed the line and opened fire first".

Mar 3: Just hours after the ending of a week-long “reduction” in violence that was crucial for Donald Trump’s peace deal in Afghanistan, the Taliban struck again: On Monday, they killed three people and injured about a dozen at a football match in Khost province. This resumption of violence will not surprise anyone actually invested in peace for that troubled country. The point of the U.S.-Taliban deal was never peace. It was to try and cover up an ignominious exit for the U.S., driven by an election-bound president who feels no responsibility toward that country or to the broader region.

Seen from South Asia, every point we know about in the agreement is a concession by Trump to the Taliban. Most importantly, it completes a long-term effort by the U.S. to delegitimize the elected government in Kabul — and, by extension, Afghanistan’s constitution. Afghanistan’s president is already balking at releasing 5,000 Taliban prisoners before intra-Afghan talks can begin — a provision that his government did not approve.

One particularly cringe-worthy aspect: The agreement refers to the Taliban throughout  as “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan that is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban.” This unwieldy nomenclature validates the Taliban’s claim to be a government equivalent to the one in Kabul, just not the one recognised at the moment by the U.S. When read together with the second part of the agreement, which binds the U.S. to not “intervene in [Afghanistan’s] domestic affairs,” the point is obvious: The Taliban is not interested in peace, but in ensuring that support for its rivals is forbidden, and its path to Kabul is cleared.

All that the U.S. has effectively gotten in return is the Taliban’s assurance that it will not allow the soil of Afghanistan to be used against the “U.S. and its allies.” True, the U.S. under Trump has shown a disturbing willingness to trust solemn assurances from autocrats; but its apparent belief in promises made by a murderous theocratic movement is even more ridiculous. Especially as the Taliban made much the same promise to an Assistant Secretary of State about Osama bin Laden while he was in the country plotting 9/11.

Nobody in the region is pleased with this agreement except for the Taliban and their backers in the Pakistani military. India has consistently held that the legitimate government in Kabul must be the basic anchor of any peace plan. Ordinary Afghans, unsurprisingly, long for peace — but they are, by all accounts, deeply skeptical about how this deal will get them there. The brave activists of the Afghan Women’s Network are worried that intra-Afghan talks will take place without adequate representation of the country’s women — who have, after all, the most to lose from a return to Taliban rule.

But the Pakistani military establishment is not hiding its glee. One retired general tweeted: “Big victory for Afghan Taliban as historic accord signed… Forced Americans to negotiate an accord from the position of parity. Setback for India.” Pakistan’s army, the Taliban’s biggest backer, longs to re-install a friendly Islamist regime in Kabul — and it has correctly estimated that, after being abandoned by Trump, the Afghan government will have sharply reduced bargaining power in any intra-Afghan peace talks. A deal with the Taliban that fails also to include its backers in the Pakistani military is meaningless.

India, meanwhile, will not see this deal as a positive for regional peace or its relationship with the U.S. It comes barely a week after Trump’s India visit, which made it painfully clear that shared strategic concerns are the only thing keeping the countries together. New Delhi remembers that India is not, on paper, a U.S. “ally.” In that respect, an intensification of terrorism targeting India, as happened the last time the U.S. withdrew from the region, would not even be a violation of Trump’s agreement. One possible outcome: Over time the government in New Delhi, which has resolutely sought to keep its ties with Kabul primarily political, may have to step up security cooperation. Nobody knows where that would lead.

The irresponsible concessions made by the U.S. in this agreement will likely disrupt South Asia for years to come, and endanger its own relationship with India going forward. But worst of all, this deal abandons those in Afghanistan who, under the shadow of war, tried to develop, for the first time, institutions that work for all Afghans. No amount of sanctimony about “ending America’s longest war” should obscure the danger and immorality of this sort of exit.