Viewing Us with Pre-Partition Eye is India's 'Mistake', Says Pakistan President

New Delhi, Jun 16: Jet fuel or ATF price on Tuesday was hiked by 16.3 per cent while petrol price was increased by 47 paise per litre and that of diesel by a record 93 paise on the back of firming international oil rates.

Aviation turbine fuel (ATF) price was hiked by ₹5,494.5 per kilolitre (kl), or 16.3 per cent, to ₹39,069.87 per kl in the national capital, according to a price notification by state-owned oil marketing companies.

This is the second straight increase in ATF price this month. Rates were hiked by a record 56.5 per cent (₹12,126.75 per kl) on June 1.

Simultaneously, petrol and diesel prices were hiked for the 10th day in a row.

Petrol price in Delhi was hiked to ₹76.73 per litre from ₹76.26, while diesel rates were increased to ₹75.19 a litre from ₹74.26, the price notification said.

In 10 hikes, petrol price has gone up by ₹5.47 per litre and diesel by Rs 5.8 a litre.

Rates have been increased across the country and vary from state to state depending on the incidence of local sales tax or VAT.

The hike in diesel rates is the highest daily increase since the state-owned fuel retailers started daily revision in rates in May 2017.

Hike for 10th consecutive day

Tuesday’s increase in petrol and diesel price marks the 10th straight day of rise in rates since oil companies on June 7 restarted revising prices in line with costs, after ending an 82-day hiatus.

The freeze in rates was imposed in mid-March soon after the government hiked excise duty on petrol and diesel to shore up additional finances.

Oil PSUs Indian Oil Corp (IOC), Bharat Petroleum Corp Ltd (BPCL) and Hindustan Petroleum Corp Ltd (HPCL) instead of passing on the excise duty hikes to customers adjusted them against the fall in the retail rates that was warranted because of fall in international oil prices.

The June 1 hike in jet fuel price had come after seven consecutive reductions in rates since February. ATF price in Delhi before the reduction cycle began in February was ₹64,323.76 per kilolitre, which got reduced to ₹21,448.62 last month.

Industry officials said the hike was necessitated because benchmark international rates have bounced back from a two-decade low.

While ATF prices are revised on 1st and 16th of every month, petrol and diesel prices are revised on a daily basis.

Oil companies used to revise ATF prices on the first of every month, but adopted fortnightly revisions on March 21 to pass on the benefit of falling international oil prices to airlines.

The World Bank says that a lack of credit and drop in private consumption have led to a gloomy growth outlook for India with a steep cut in growth rate for the current fiscal year and only a modest gain projected for the next year.

India's growth rate is forecast to be only 5 per cent for the current fiscal year, weighed down by a growth of only 4.5 per cent in the July-September quarter, according to the 2020 Global Economic Prospects report released on Wednesday.

"In India, [economic] activity was constrained by insufficient credit availability, as well as by subdued private consumption," the Bank said.

The growth rate is forecast by the Bank to pick up to 5.8 per cent in the next fiscal year and to 6.1 per cent in 2021-22.

India's growth rate was 6.8 per cent in 2018-19.

The 5 per cent growth rate projection for the current financial year is a sharp cut of 2.5 per cent from the 7.5 per cent forecast made by the Bank in January last year, toppling it from the rank of the world's fastest growing economy.

India's performance follows a global trend of lowered growth weighed down by developed economies.

The report estimated world economic growth rate to be only 2.4 per cent last year and forecast it to edge up 0.1 per cent to 2.5 per cent in the current year.

Even with the lower growth rate of 5 per cent in the current fiscal year and 5.8 per cent forecast for the next, India holds the second rank among large economies, behind only China with an estimated growth rate of 6.1 per cent for 2019 and 5.9 per cent this year.

The report blamed "weak confidence, liquidity issues in the financial sector" and "weakness in credit from non-bank financial companies" for India's slowdown.

The Bank predicated India's recovery to 5.8 per cent in the coming financial year for India but "on the monetary policy stance remaining accommodative" and the assumption that "the stimulative fiscal and structural measures already taken will begin to pay off."

It also warned that sharper-than-expected slowdown in major external markets such as United States and Europe, would affect South Asia through trade, financial, and confidence channels, especially for countries with strong trade links to these economies."

The Bank said that the growth of advanced economies was 1.6 per cent last year and "is anticipated to slip to 1.4 per cent in 2020 in part due to continued softness in manufacturing."

In contrast the growth of emerging market and developing countries is expected to accelerate from 3.5 per cent last year to 4.1 per cent this year, the report said.

In South Asia, Bangladesh is estimated to have the highest growth rate of 7.2 per cent in the current fiscal year, although down from 8.1 per cent last fiscal year.

But its higher regional growth rates are coming off a lower base with a per capital gross domestic product of $1,698 compared to $2,010 for India.

Bangladesh is expected to grow by 7.3 per cent in the next financial year.

Pakistan's growth rate is estimated at only 2.4 per cent in the current fiscal year and is projected to rise to 3 per cent in the next, according to the Bank.

The Bank blamed monetary tightening in Pakistan for a sharp deceleration in fixed investment and a considerable softening in private consumption for the fall in growth rate from 3.3 per cent in the 2018-19 fiscal year.

Sri Lanka's growth rate was estimated to be 2.7 per cent last year and forecast to grow to 3.3 per cent this year.

Nepal grew by an estimated 6.4 per cent in the current fiscal year and will rise to 6.5 per cent in the next.

Mar 3: Just hours after the ending of a week-long “reduction” in violence that was crucial for Donald Trump’s peace deal in Afghanistan, the Taliban struck again: On Monday, they killed three people and injured about a dozen at a football match in Khost province. This resumption of violence will not surprise anyone actually invested in peace for that troubled country. The point of the U.S.-Taliban deal was never peace. It was to try and cover up an ignominious exit for the U.S., driven by an election-bound president who feels no responsibility toward that country or to the broader region.

Seen from South Asia, every point we know about in the agreement is a concession by Trump to the Taliban. Most importantly, it completes a long-term effort by the U.S. to delegitimize the elected government in Kabul — and, by extension, Afghanistan’s constitution. Afghanistan’s president is already balking at releasing 5,000 Taliban prisoners before intra-Afghan talks can begin — a provision that his government did not approve.

One particularly cringe-worthy aspect: The agreement refers to the Taliban throughout  as “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan that is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban.” This unwieldy nomenclature validates the Taliban’s claim to be a government equivalent to the one in Kabul, just not the one recognised at the moment by the U.S. When read together with the second part of the agreement, which binds the U.S. to not “intervene in [Afghanistan’s] domestic affairs,” the point is obvious: The Taliban is not interested in peace, but in ensuring that support for its rivals is forbidden, and its path to Kabul is cleared.

All that the U.S. has effectively gotten in return is the Taliban’s assurance that it will not allow the soil of Afghanistan to be used against the “U.S. and its allies.” True, the U.S. under Trump has shown a disturbing willingness to trust solemn assurances from autocrats; but its apparent belief in promises made by a murderous theocratic movement is even more ridiculous. Especially as the Taliban made much the same promise to an Assistant Secretary of State about Osama bin Laden while he was in the country plotting 9/11.

Nobody in the region is pleased with this agreement except for the Taliban and their backers in the Pakistani military. India has consistently held that the legitimate government in Kabul must be the basic anchor of any peace plan. Ordinary Afghans, unsurprisingly, long for peace — but they are, by all accounts, deeply skeptical about how this deal will get them there. The brave activists of the Afghan Women’s Network are worried that intra-Afghan talks will take place without adequate representation of the country’s women — who have, after all, the most to lose from a return to Taliban rule.

But the Pakistani military establishment is not hiding its glee. One retired general tweeted: “Big victory for Afghan Taliban as historic accord signed… Forced Americans to negotiate an accord from the position of parity. Setback for India.” Pakistan’s army, the Taliban’s biggest backer, longs to re-install a friendly Islamist regime in Kabul — and it has correctly estimated that, after being abandoned by Trump, the Afghan government will have sharply reduced bargaining power in any intra-Afghan peace talks. A deal with the Taliban that fails also to include its backers in the Pakistani military is meaningless.

India, meanwhile, will not see this deal as a positive for regional peace or its relationship with the U.S. It comes barely a week after Trump’s India visit, which made it painfully clear that shared strategic concerns are the only thing keeping the countries together. New Delhi remembers that India is not, on paper, a U.S. “ally.” In that respect, an intensification of terrorism targeting India, as happened the last time the U.S. withdrew from the region, would not even be a violation of Trump’s agreement. One possible outcome: Over time the government in New Delhi, which has resolutely sought to keep its ties with Kabul primarily political, may have to step up security cooperation. Nobody knows where that would lead.

The irresponsible concessions made by the U.S. in this agreement will likely disrupt South Asia for years to come, and endanger its own relationship with India going forward. But worst of all, this deal abandons those in Afghanistan who, under the shadow of war, tried to develop, for the first time, institutions that work for all Afghans. No amount of sanctimony about “ending America’s longest war” should obscure the danger and immorality of this sort of exit.