8 jawans killed, 19 injured in militant attack ahead of PM visit

New Delhi, Jun 16: Despite Prime Minister Narendra Modi led government’s attempt to downplay the border dispute with China, matters have heated up unprecedentedly along the Line of Actual Control (LAC)- the effective Sino-India border in Eastern Ladakh. 

The country has lost three precious lives – an army officer and two soldiers. The last time blood was spilled on the LAC, before the latest episode, was 45 years ago when the Chinese ambushed an Assam Rifles patrol in Tulung La.

India had lost four soldiers on October 20, 1975 in Tulung La, the last time bullets were fired on the India-China border though both the countries witnessed bitter stand-offs later at Sumdorong Chu valley in 1987, Depsang in 2013, Chumar in 2014 and Doklam in 2017.

Between 1962 and 1975, the biggest clash between India and China took place in Nathu La pass in 1967 when reports suggest that around 80 Indian soldiers were killed and many more Chinese personnel.

While three soldiers, including a Commanding Officer, were killed in the latest episode in Galwan Valley, the government describes it as a "violent clash" and does not mention opening fire.

New Delhi described the locality where the 1975 incident took place as "well within" its territory only to be rebuffed by Beijing as "sheer reversal of black and white and confusion of right and wrong".

The Ministry of External Affairs had then said that the Chinese had crossed the LAC and ambushed the soldiers while Beijing claimed the Indians entered their territory and did not return despite warnings.

The Indian government maintained that the ambush on the Assam Rifles' patrol in 1975 took place "500 metres south of Tulung" on the border between India and Tibet and "therefore in Indian territory". It said Chinese soldiers "penetrating" Indian territory implied a "change in China's position" on the border question but the Chinese denied this and blamed India for the incident.

The US diplomatic cables quoted an Indian military intelligence officer saying that the Chinese had erected stone walls on the Indian side of Tulung La and from these positions fired several hundred rounds at the Indian patrol.

"Four of the Indians had gone into a leading position while two (the ones who escaped) remained behind. The senior military intelligence officer emphasised that the soldiers on the Indian patrol were from the area and had patrolled that same region many times before," the cable said.

One of the US cables showed that former US Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger sought details of the October 1975 clash "without approaching the host governments on actual location of October 20 incident". He also wanted to know what ground rules were followed regarding the proximity of LAC by border patrols.

A cable sent from the US mission in India on November 4, 1975 appeared to have doubts about the Chinese account saying it was "highly defensive".

"Given the unsettled situation on the sub-continent, particularly in Bangladesh, both Chinese and Indian authorities have authorised stepped up patrols along the disputed border. The clash may well have ensued when two such patrols unexpectedly encountered each other," it said.

Another cable from China on the same day quoted another October 1974 cable, which spoke about Chinese officials being concerned for long that "some hotheaded person on the PRC (People's Republic of China) might provoke an incident that could lead to renewed Sino-Indian hostilities. It went on to say that this clash suggested that "such concerns and apprehensions are not unwarranted".

According to the United States diplomatic cables, Chinese Foreign Ministry on November 3, 1975 disputed the statement of the MEA spokesperson, who said the incident took place inside Indian territory.

The Chinese had said "sheer reversal of black and white and confusion of right and wrong". In its version of the 1975 incident, they said Indian troops crossed the LAC at 1:30 PM at Tulung Pass on the Eastern Sector and "intruded" into their territory when personnel at the Civilian Checkpost at Chuna in Tibet warned them to withdraw.

Ignoring this, they claimed, Indian soldiers made "continual provocation and even opened fire at the Chinese civilian checkpost personnel, posing a grave threat to the life of the latter. The Chinese civilian checkpost personnel were obliged to fire back in self defence."

The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson had also said they told the Indian side that they could collect the bodies "anytime" and on October 28, collected the bodies, weapons and ammunition and "signed a receipt".

The US cables from the then USSR suggested that the official media carried reports from Delhi on the October 1975 incident and they cited only Indian accounts of the incident "ridiculing alleged Chinese claims that the Indians crossed the line and opened fire first".

Jun 9: Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants all 1.3 billion Indians to be “vocal for local” — meaning, to not just use domestically made products but also to promote them. As an overseas citizen living in Hong Kong, I’m doing my bit by very vocally demanding Indian mangoes on every trip to the grocery. But half the summer is gone, and not a single slice so far.

My loss is due to India’s COVID-19 lockdown, which has severely pinched logistics, a perennial challenge in the huge, infrastructure-starved country. But more worrying than the disruption is the fruity political response to it. Rather than being a wake-up call for fixing supply chains, the pandemic seems to be putting India on an isolationist course. Why?

Granted that the liberal view that trade is good and autarky bad isn’t exactly fashionable anywhere right now. What makes India’s lurch troublesome is that the pace and direction of economic nationalism may be set by domestic business interests. The Indian liberals, many of whom are Western-trained academics, authors and — at least until a few years ago — policy makers, want a more competitive economy. They will be powerless to prevent the slide.

Modi’s call for a self-reliant India has been echoed by Home Minister Amit Shah, the cabinet’s unofficial No. 2, in a television interview. If Indians don’t buy foreign-made goods, the economy will see a jump, he said. The strategy — although it’s too nebulous yet to call it that — has a geopolitical element. A military standoff with China is under way, apparently triggered by India’s completion of a road and bridge near the common border in the tense Himalayan region of Ladakh. It’s very expensive to fight even a limited war there. With India’s economy flattened by COVID, New Delhi may be looking for ways to restore the status quo and send Beijing a signal.

Economic boycotts, such as Chinese consumers’ rejection of Japanese goods over territorial disputes in the East China Sea, are well understood as statecraft. In these times, it’s not even necessary to name an enemy. An undercurrent of popular anger against China, the source of both the virus and India’s biggest bilateral trade deficit, is supposed to do the job. But is it ever that easy?

A hastily introduced policy to stock only local goods in police and paramilitary canteens became a farcical exercise after the list of banned items ended up including products by the local units of Colgate-Palmolive Co., Nestle SA, and Unilever NV, which have had significant Indian operations for between 60 and 90 years, as well as Dabur India Ltd., a New Delhi-based maker of Ayurveda brands. The since-withdrawn list demonstrates the practical difficulty of bureaucrats trying to find things in a globalized world that are 100% indigenous.

Free-trade champions fret that the prime minister, whom they saw as being on their side six years ago, is acting against their advice to dismantle statist controls on land, labor and capital to help make the country more competitive. Engage with the world more, not less, they caution. But Modi also has to satisfy the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the umbrella Hindu organisation that gets him votes. Its backbone of small traders, builders and businessmen — the RSS admits only men — was losing patience with the anemic economy even before the pandemic. Now, they’re in deep trouble, because India’s broken financial system won’t deliver even state-guaranteed loans to them.

The U.S.-China tensions — over trade, intellectual property, COVID responsibility and Hong Kong’s autonomy — offer a perfect backdrop. A dire domestic economy and trouble at the border provide the foreground. Big business will dial economic nationalism up and down to hit a trifecta of goals: Block competition from the People's Republic; make Western rivals fall in line and do joint ventures; and tap deep overseas capital markets. The first goal is being achieved with newly placed restrictions on investment from any country that shares a land border with India. The second aim is to be realized by corporate lobbying to influence India's whimsical economic policies. As for the third objective, with the regulatory environment becoming tougher for U.S.-listed Chinese companies like Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., an opportunity may open up for Indian firms.

All this may bring India Shenzhen-style enclaves of manufacturing and trade, but it will concentrate economic power in fewer hands, something that worries liberals. They’re moved by the suffering of India’s low-wage workers, who have borne the brunt of the COVID shutdown. But when their vision of a more just society and fairer income distribution prompts them to make common cause with the ideological Left, they’re quickly repelled by the Marxist voodoo that all cash, property, bonds and real estate held by citizens or within the nation “must be treated as national resources available during this crisis.” Who will invest in a country that does that instead of just printing money?

At the same time, when liberals look to the business class, they see a sudden swelling of support for ideas like a universal basic income. They wonder if this isn’t a ploy by industry to outsource part of the cost of labor to the taxpayer. Slogans like Modi’s vocal-for-local stir the pot and thicken the confusion. The value-conscious Indian consumer couldn’t give two hoots for calls to buy Indian, but large firms will know how to exploit economic nationalism. One day soon, I’ll get my mangoes — from them.

Apr 24: Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan on Friday sought Prime Minister Narendra Modi's intervention in bringing bodies of Keralites who died in the Gulf countries due to non-COVID-19 reasons to the state without any delay for performing last rites in their home towns.

In a letter, he wanted Modi to direct Indian embassies to issue necessary clearances without seeking individual approvals from the Ministry of Home Affairs and avoid any delay so that the remains reach Kerala early. It has been learnt that a 'clearance certificate' from the Indian embassies concerned was required to process the application for bringing home the bodies.

The embassies are insisting on production of no-objection certificate from the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, he said in the letter, a copy of which was released to the media here on Friday. The Centre had already agreed that in case the deaths are not COVID related, such certificates are not necessary.

The bodies are now being brought in the cargo planes as passenger flights are not being operated due to the lockdown. Chief Minister said he had received several grievances from the NRKs in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries on the delay in bringing home the bodies of those who died there. "They are already under tremendous stress and anxiety due to the lockdown imposed in those countries and the consequent stoppage of international flights", Vijayan said.